|
প্ৰত্যেকটো ধ্ৰুপদী উপাদানৰে নিজা প্ৰাকৃতিক স্থান আছে৷ ধ্ৰুপদী উপাদানবোৰে বিশ্বব্ৰহ্মাণ্ড বা পৃথিৱীৰ কেন্দ্ৰলৈ গতি কৰাৰ প্ৰৱণতা দেখুৱায়৷ পানীয়ে পৃথিৱীৰ কেন্দ্ৰৰ চাৰিওকাষে থকা গোলাকাৰ অংশতোলৈ গতি কৰে৷ বায়ুয়ে পানীপূৰ্ণ গোলাকাৰ অংশৰ চাৰিওকাষে স্থান লয়৷ জুইয়ে চন্দ্ৰই পৰিভ্ৰমণ কৰা গতিপথৰ চাৰিওকাষে স্থান লোৱাৰ প্ৰবণতা দেখুৱায়৷ যদিহে এই ধ্ৰুপদী উপাদান সমহূহ সিহঁতৰ স্বাভাৱিক স্থানৰ পৰা আঁতৰোৱা হয়, তেন্তে ই আকৌ পূৰ্বৰ স্থানলৈ ঘুৰি যোৱাৰ প্ৰবণতা দেখুৱায়৷ এই গতি কোনো বাহ্যিক শক্তি জড়িত নথকা স্বাভাৱিক গতি৷ <!-- This section is linked from [[Retrocausality]]. See [[WP:MOS#Section management]] -->
====কাৰ্যকাৰণবাদ (Causality), চাৰিটা কাৰক====<!-- This section is linked from [[Retrocausality]]. See [[WP:MOS#Section management]] -->
Aristotle suggested that the reason for anything coming about can be attributed to four different types of simultaneously active causal factors:
*[[Material cause]] describes the material out of which something is composed. Thus the material cause of a table is wood, and the material cause of a car is rubber and steel. It is not about action. It does not mean one domino knocks over another domino.
*The [[formal cause]] is its form, i.e., the arrangement of that matter. It tells us what a thing is, that any thing is determined by the definition, form, pattern, essence, whole, synthesis or archetype. It embraces the account of causes in terms of fundamental principles or general laws, as the whole (i.e., macrostructure) is the cause of its parts, a relationship known as the whole-part causation. Plainly put, the formal cause is the idea existing in the first place as exemplar in the mind of the sculptor, and in the second place as intrinsic, determining cause, embodied in the matter. Formal cause could only refer to the essential quality of causation. A simple example of the formal cause is the mental image or idea that allows an artist, architect, or engineer to create his drawings.
*The [[efficient cause]] is "the primary source", or that from which the change under consideration proceeds. It identifies 'what makes of what is made and what causes change of what is changed' and so suggests all sorts of agents, nonliving or living, acting as the sources of change or movement or rest. Representing the current understanding of causality as the relation of cause and effect, this covers the modern definitions of "cause" as either the agent or agency or particular events or states of affairs. So, take the two dominoes, this time of equal weighting, the first is knocked over causing the second also to fall over.
*The [[final cause]] is its purpose, or that for the sake of which a thing exists or is done, including both purposeful and instrumental actions and activities. The final cause or teleos is the purpose or function that something is supposed to serve. This covers modern ideas of motivating causes, such as volition, need, desire, ethics, or spiritual beliefs.
Additionally, things can be causes of one another, causing each other reciprocally, as hard work causes fitness and vice versa, although not in the same way or function, the one is as the beginning of change, the other as the goal. (Thus Aristotle first suggested a reciprocal or circular causality as a relation of mutual dependence or influence of cause upon effect). Moreover, Aristotle indicated that the same thing can be the cause of contrary effects; its presence and absence may result in different outcomes. Simply it is the goal or purpose that brings about an event. Our two dominoes require someone or something to intentionally knock over the first domino, since it cannot fall of its own accord.
Aristotle marked two modes of causation: proper (prior) causation and accidental (chance) causation. All causes, proper and incidental, can be spoken as potential or as actual, particular or generic. The same language refers to the effects of causes, so that generic effects assigned to generic causes, particular effects to particular causes, operating causes to actual effects. Essentially, causality does not suggest a temporal relation between the cause and the effect.
====আলোকবিজ্ঞান====
তেওঁৰ সমসাময়িক দাৰ্শনিকসকলৰ তুলনাত এৰিষ্ট'টলৰ আলোক সম্পৰ্কীয় ধাৰণাৰ তত্বসমূহ বেছি নিখুঁত আছিল। খ্ৰী:পূ: ৩৫০-ত এৰিষ্ট'টলৰ দ্বাৰা লিখিত ''Problemata''-ত কৃষ্ণ কক্ষ [([[ইংৰাজী]]:camera obscura) -ই এনে এবিধ আলোকীয় সজুঁলি যাৰ দ্বাৰা ইয়াৰ কোনো চৌপাশৰ প্ৰতিবিম্ব কোনো পৰ্দাত প্ৰক্ষেপ কৰিব পৰা যায়)] সম্পৰ্কীয় ধাৰণাৰ সাক্ষ্য পোৱা যায়। এৰিষ্ট'টলৰ আহিলাত এটা সূক্ষ্ম ছিদ্ৰৰে সৈতে এটা অন্ধকাৰ কক্ষ আছিল। এই ছিদ্ৰৰে সূৰ্যৰ পোহৰ প্ৰৱেশ কৰিব পাৰিছিল। এৰিষ্ট'টলে এই আহিলাৰে সূৰ্য পৰ্যবেক্ষণ কৰিছিল আৰু মন কৰিছিল যে, ছিদ্ৰৰ আকৃতি যিয়েই নহওক লাগে সূৰ্যৰ আকৃতি সম্পূৰ্ণ শুদ্ধ ভাৱে গোলাকাৰ হিচাপে প্ৰদৰ্শিত হয়। আধুনিক কেমেৰাসমূহত ইয়েই ''ডায়েফ্ৰাম''([[ইংৰাজী]]:Diaphragm)ৰ অনুৰূপ। এৰিষ্ট'টলে এই কথাটোও পৰ্যবেক্ষণ কৰিছিল যে, ছিদ্ৰৰ পৰা প্ৰতিবিম্ব প্ৰক্ষেপিত পৃষ্ঠৰ দূৰত্ব বৃদ্ধিৰ লগে লগে প্ৰতিবিম্বৰ আকাৰো বিবৰ্ধিত হয়। <ref>{{cite web|author=Michael Lahanas |url=http://www.mlahanas.de/Greeks/Optics.htm |title=Optics and ancient Greeks |publisher=Mlahanas.de |date= |accessdate=26 April 2009| archiveurl= https://web.archive.org/web/20090411051535/http://www.mlahanas.de/Greeks/Optics.htm| archivedate= 11 April 2009 <!--DASHBot-->| deadurl= no}}</ref>
====সুযোগ আৰু স্বতঃস্ফূৰ্ত্ততা====
এৰিষ্ট'টলৰ ধাৰণা অনুসৰি, স্বতঃস্ফূৰ্ত্ততা আৰু সুযোগ হৈছে কোনো সংঘটনৰ কাৰণ আৰু ইহঁত অন্য ধৰণৰ কাৰণৰ পৰা পৃথক। কোনো সংঘটনৰ কাৰণ হিচাপে সুযোগ ইয়াৰ অঘটনৰ ক্ষেত্ৰৰ অধীন। It is "from what is spontaneous" (but note that what is spontaneous does not come from chance). For a better understanding of Aristotle's conception of "chance" it might be better to think of "coincidence": Something takes place by chance if a person sets out with the intent of having one thing take place, but with the result of another thing (not intended) taking place.
===অধিবিদ্যা (Metaphysics)===
[[File:Uni Freiburg - Philosophen 4.jpg|thumb|Statue of Aristotle (1915) by Cipri Adolf Bermann at the [[University of Freiburg]] [[Freiburg im Breisgau|im Breisgau]]]]
Aristotleএৰিষ্ট'টলে definesঅধিবিদ্যাক metaphysics as "the knowledge of [[hylomorphism|immaterial]] being," or ofবা "being in the highest degree of [[abstraction]]." Heহিচাপে refersউল্লেখ toকৰিছিল৷ metaphysicsতাৰোপৰি asতেওঁৰ "firstধাৰণা philosophy",অনুসৰি asঅধিবিদ্যা wellহৈছে asপ্ৰথম "theদৰ্শন theologicআৰু 'তাত্বিক বিজ্ঞান'৷ science."
====নিৰ্যাস (Substance), বিভৱ (potentiality) আৰু বাস্তৱিকতা (actuality)====
Aristotle examines the concepts of [[Substance theory|substance]] and [[essence]] (''ousia'') in his ''Metaphysics'' (Book VII), and he concludes that a particular substance is a combination of both matter and form. In book VIII, he distinguishes the matter of the substance as the [[Material substratum|substratum]], or the stuff of which it is composed. For example, the matter of a house is the bricks, stones, timbers etc., or whatever constitutes the ''potential'' house, while the form of the substance is the ''actual'' house, namely 'covering for bodies and chattels' or any other [[Genus-differentia definition|differentia]] (see also [[predicables]]) that let us define something as a house. The formula that gives the components is the account of the matter, and the formula that gives the differentia is the account of the form.<ref>Aristotle, ''Metaphysics'' VIII 1043a 10–30</ref>
====সাৰ্বজনীনতা (Universal) আৰু বিশেষত্বতা (particulars)====
এৰিষ্ট'টলৰ পূৰ্বসুৰী প্লেটৰ মত অনুসৰি প্ৰত্যেক বস্তুৰে এটা সাৰ্বজনীন ৰূপ আছে৷ ই বস্তুটোৰ নিজা কোনো বৈশিষ্ট্য বা অন্য বস্তুৰ সৈতে সম্পৰ্কও হ'ব পাৰে৷
Aristotle's predecessor, Plato, argued that all things have a universal form, which could be either a property, or a relation to other things. When we look at an apple, for example, we see an apple, and we can also analyze a form of an apple. In this distinction, there is a particular apple and a universal form of an apple. Moreover, we can place an apple next to a book, so that we can speak of both the book and apple as being next to each other.
===জীৱবিজ্ঞান আৰু ভেষজবিদ্যা===
| 